Monday, April 8, 2013

Peaceful matter-antimatte pairing looks more real

Interesting. This is the first time I read about the Majorana fermions, a very particular fermion which is also its own antiparticle. Scientists at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign are one step closer to showing these exists.

The article in the New Scientist.

Friday, April 5, 2013

IT Pro confession: How I helped in the BIGGEST DDoS OF ALL TIME


Spamhaus is a Dutch company specialized in gathering lists of spam sources on the Internet and publishing them. Many mail sites - mine was as well until I moved it to Google - use their service to drop the spam before it even hits the mailbox. So, positive.

Enters another player, CuberBunker, another Dutch company, specialized in hosting pretty much anything except "terrorism and pedopornography." At least that's what it claims.

Spamhaus volunteers started detecting spam being sent from the CyberBunker servers, and they proceeded into blacklisting them. That started the beef between the two. You will find the CloudFlare blog entry here, CloudFlare being Spamhaus's hosting company.

CyberBunker clients, instead of doing something technically clever, ran a script-kiddie type DDoS: a massive attack using DNS amplification. As someone put it, that was akin to trying to take a person down by using a machine gun in a crowd.

This was made possible due to the large number of DNS accepting recursive resolutions from anywhere on the Internet.

Trevor Pott, a sysadmin, took the courage to write a short article for The Register on how he was an unwilling help for the CyberBunker side: he explains the mistake he made and how he corrected them. He also has a few cool tricks, some of them helped in limiting the damage. Even the US-CERT has a document on securing the common DNS servers. Oh, this document was published in 2006 ... the problem is nothing new. Some more information and stats can be found on OpenResolver.

Bottom line:


  • Sysadmins tend to forget about the "small" services that keep the network running: NTP, DNS, DHCP and so forth, and often, these servers are left unpatched or untested;
  • That sucks, but different version of the same software may have different default configurations! The keyword is "inventory", and knowing where each component of your infrastructure runs. And reading the release notes;
  • There is no one-magic-bullet-security-stuff that will solve all the problem: Trevor had a few layers in place that mitigated the damages caused by the misconfiguration. Namely, he limited the bandwidth available for DNS to 500Kb/s. He initially saw a 10Mb/s surge;
  • If you have people like Trevor who understand what they are doing, your network is in good hands.

Wednesday, April 3, 2013

Panorama From Curiosity Rover Brings Mars to Your Computer Screen

The only word to describe this is "wow." A panorama of Mars.

Enjoy the panorama!

Monday, April 1, 2013

Employees deliberately ignore security rules

... or at least that's the perception Information Security teams have in 80% of the cases of a survey done by Lieberman.

That number doesn't really surprise me: for one, your usual IS team's perception is in my view always a bit biased toward the "the users are evil/stupid" side and second, most employees care only for one thing: having their job done as quickly as they can.

The main culprit? Convenience! People tend to forget all their security reflexes when two conditions are met: (a) what they are working with is not their own, and (b) bypassing security will be convenient or helpful for them.

As an example of (a): no one with a brain would put a post-it in his/her wallet with the PIN code for the neighboring bank card. However, lots of developers don't see a problem in storing the same information (credit card number, CVV2, name, address) in a single, unencrypted table.

And for (b), we probably all know someone who used an HTTPS proxy to bypass a filtering proxy, or who has all the passwords for his/her applications in a spreadsheet called "password".

Being in the IS team is often exhausting and depressing: seeing people do "stupid" things because it's convenient can be really taxing, especially when you don't have a good management support, and seeing very stupid things getting away without even as much as a slap on the wrist as led a few people I know to reconsider their careers. In that regard, being a IS professional is akin to be a cop: you are celebrated when you help capture the bad guy, but loathed when you stop someone and fine him for not respecting a speed limit.

Employees in a company, like drivers on a road, usually don't consider the policies as applying to them, or justify their acts but stating that the policy is "retard", that not being able, for example, to surf Facebook over lunchtime from a desk computer is stupid and why should it be the case. No matter how reasonable the explanation is (risk of having malware coming in, of having confidential information exposed and so forth), the employee will always reply that "this happens to the others, I am careful and I pay attention not to do anything insecure."

In that regard, management and executives have a few important roles to play: educate the users by the example and show that, even if they could demand the exemption, they don't bypass the security policies, and by making sure that there are commensurate reactions to any actions: I am not talking about firing an employee because he/she clicked on a link in an e-mail, but having an appropriate reaction, such as the obligation to follow a security course or assist in repairing the damages caused. For that last one, I have lived in my previous lives a number of situations where a user would introduce a virus in the network, but would be allowed to go home at 5pm, while IT had to work overnight to clean the systems.

In my views, it is important that this perception of "the users are plotting against us" changes, and it won't as long as the users don't understand that the IS team is not the problem, but rather an help.




Friday, March 29, 2013

Can Big Data Make Our Healthcare Systems Better?

"The corridor was empty, except for the two maintenance drones which tirelessly disinfected the walls, ceiling and floor 24/7. In room 109, a large Heart Emergency Unit was setting its electrodes on Mr. Doe's chest: Tammy, the automated brain behind the health monitoring systems, had detected the precursor signs of a potential cardiac arrest."
Fiction? Maybe. But two searchers have devised an approach that shows better results than treatment-as-usual performed by real doctors. The latter have to face multiple challenges: an always increasing complexity and costs, the numerous treatment options, with new ones added daily, the delay between researches and practice in the field, the multiplicity of information sources to cite but a few.

A computer can analyse hundreds of options in a short time, finding the costs and benefits of each and determining what course of action would be the best under a number of constraints. It can also take into consideration new treatments and discoveries faster than a human doctor would be able to.

As the therapeutic options expands, so do the specialization of doctors: training is a lengthy and costly process, and the limited human abilities force doctors to increasingly specialize. The result is that possible treatments out of a doctor's area of specialization might be ignored, resulting in a potential increase in cost and decrease in patient outcome.

Two searchers have used Artificial Intelligence techniques: machine learning, Markov Decision Process (MDP) and Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) to model Dynamic Decision Networks (DDN) for therapeutic options, such as continuing a treatment or stopping it and so forth. The results are encouraging and the outcome was a modeled better patient outcome as defined by the Outcome Rating Scale (ORS) of the Client-Directed Outcome-Informed (CDOI). It also showed a number of improvement with lowered costs.

Remains the question on how these new techniques will be used: it can be for "good", i.e. to help doctors designs better treatment options, but also for "bad", for instance by insurance companies to set a maximal reimbursement based on the number calculated by the system.

The paper has been published on arXiv as arXiv:1301.2158v1 [cs.AI].


Wednesday, March 27, 2013

A nice introduction to Sage on the CUNYMath Blog

SAGE is an open-source symbolic math computation software. Unless Octave or Matlab, it can process and computes objects such as equations, rings or fields, graphs and so forth.

For example, it can symbolically compute series, such as



sage: sum((1)/(n^4),n,1,Infinity)
1/90*pi^4


There is a very nice introduction on the CUNYMath Blog, that goes over a few of the basics. For a longer intro, there are tons of tutorial on the SageMath website. And for people wanting to learn calculus and/or Sage, the Smith College has a page on Calculus in Context.


Monday, March 25, 2013

PCI-Compliant Supermarket Chain Breached

An example of what I claimed in my previous article about PCI compliance:

"Compliance is not insurance"

Being PCI/HIPAA/HITECH/Whatever compliant will never guarantee you will not get hacked. It will just tell  that at one point in time, your infrastructure/process/people conformed to a checklist. Nothing more.

Back in the days, when the bad guys wanted to go after a supermarket's money, he had to get a weapon or something that looked like a weapon, go to the supermarket, rob the money and flee. Nowadays, he just have to put his hands on the credit card numbers, the CVV2. And cha-ching!

And the differences don't stop there.

In the old days, the supermarket was affected by the loss: if the robber put his hands on the money, it was the money left by customers in payment of the goods. Not an access to the customers' bank accounts as it is the case nowadays, so this shifted the "hit" from the supermarket to the clients.

The amount was limited by how many customers were there, how often the money was collected and/or transferred to a safe and so forth. With the current system, if the bad guy steals a thousand credit cards, he could have the ability to get more than half a million US dollars, provided he withdraws $500 per account. He withdraws ONLY $500 per account.

Way easier and more convenient than risking being shot or maimed by an angry salesperson. Or being caught by the police.