This is interesting: a team of researchers at MIT have designed a way to find the underlying network under an observed network. This allows to find the direct dependencies in a network, separating in the process the indirect links, or elements that just "tag along" other elements.
The paper is here, but behind a paywall.
News about linux, computer, computer science, mathematics and white hot chocolate, the most beautiful drink in this world.
Wednesday, August 7, 2013
Monday, August 5, 2013
You’ve got mail: Someone else’s medical test results

Doctors and Internet don't mix well: here is an article on a few mix-ups involving e-mails and doctors. A reporter for the Boston Globe received a few e-mails with medical results for people with names similar to hers.
From this, a possible attack I can think of is to create a number of e-mails with names similar to a target. There is a chance a misspelling at a doctor's office will land you some results.
Friday, August 2, 2013
FACTBOX - Hacking talks that got axed
There may be various reasons for that, such as "the company doesn't want its reputation to publicly suffer" or "black hats may get the information and turn it to their advantage." There may also be an unsaid reason: some companies develop exploits for these vulnerabilities and sell them to "trustworthy" Governments and Agencies. Examples include VUPEN and the (in)famous FinFisher, part of Gamma Group. It is to be noted that the latter doesn't explicitly mention that its products are reserved for the same "trustworthy" Governments and Agencies, and as a reminder, a Gamma Group offer was found among torture equipment in 2011 in Egypt, when rioters invaded the State Security Investigations Services HQ. Given that private companies do it, there is no reason to believe that governmental agencies around the world don't do the same.
In that light, any publication of any kind of vulnerability is a hindrance: not only it may force the vendor to take action and fix the vulnerability, but it also gives other security researchers a base on where to start looking for ways of detecting or mitigating the vulnerability.
The argument of "it may help the bad guys" is not entirely valid: the cybercrime world has shown many times it can find vulnerabilities on its own, be if for software Zero-days or hardware hacks. To believe that a security researcher is the only one to look for vulnerability for a given piece of technology is simply unrealistic: if it can lead to money - and most of the time it can - the bad guys will have an interest in it.
Remains the reputation concern, which may also be a poor excuse. A number of companies. mostly dealing in the Open Source movement, have opted to publicly disclose everything concerning vulnerabilities and breaches. As a result, some have actually gained recognition and the trust of their users, as they know what to expect. A real excuse is the cost of fixing a vulnerability: it may take a lot of work, which translates into hard cash for the companies, and that often for products available for free (think "Adobe Reader", "Adobe Flash" or "Oracle Java" to name a few of the usual suspects.) On the hardware side, it is even worse: if it is possible to distribute a patch, applying it to millions of cars or door locks is problematic, as this fix may need a special tech.
A concept that has been developed over the last few years is "responsible disclosure", a discussion between the security researcher who found the vulnerability and the company that makes the affected product. The "responsible" part is that a delay is negotiated before the vulnerability is made public. However, this has been slowly replaced by "vulnerability commercialization": a company, such as iDefense or TippingPoint, pays any vulnerability (with a proof of concept) discovered. The question is: "but what happens after?"
That concept of disclosure is very sensitive: it has been used in the past as a form of blackmail against the affected company, either to have them address the problem quickly or to simply extort money. These companies are no angels either, and often used the courts to threaten the security researchers.
As you see, this is a very difficult topic, and not one I expect to see settled in the near future.
Wednesday, July 31, 2013
Social Engineering as the Biggest Threat to Help Desk Security
From a recent SANS survey, 69% of respondents found that social engineering is the biggest threat to help desk security. Here is a link to the article on net-security.org and a link to the SANS white paper.
Monday, July 29, 2013
“NASDAQ is owned.” Five men charged in largest financial hack ever
I am not surprised: "NASDAQ is owned" are the words sent in a IM from an eastern Europe hacker just after he got some administrative credentials for one of NASDAQ's internal networks.
As I said in the past: "there are two types of companies, the ones that have been hacked and the ones that don't know it yet."
As I said in the past: "there are two types of companies, the ones that have been hacked and the ones that don't know it yet."
Wednesday, July 10, 2013
Free Science Books!
If you like a good science book to accompany you, you will find a lot of free ones here.
Monday, July 8, 2013
NY state will fight fake IDs
An interesting article on initiatives taken by the New York state against fake IDs. I disagree with the comment "While the old-school images might seem odd, the new production method and a barrage of features both seen and unseen will make the licenses virtually impossible to forge."
Nothing is impossible to forge. It is just a matter of technical difficulties, cost and time. And making a document "sufficiently close" to the legit version is enough to achieve deception.
Nothing is impossible to forge. It is just a matter of technical difficulties, cost and time. And making a document "sufficiently close" to the legit version is enough to achieve deception.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)

