Okay, don't try this at home: the researcher(s) did this illegally, and if someone files a complaint, she, he or they can be in very serious trouble, facing fines and possible jail time.
An unnamed researcher or a group of researchers did a scan of the Internet and, when they found any, leveraged unprotected devices. The access was granted with "admin:admin", "root:root", "admin:" or "root:". It seems that, even though we are in 2013, several thousands of devices are not protected by a serious password. From the look of it, I would say these are the defaults.
During their scan and when accessing these devices, they found a number of them compromised by a really-malware botnet, Aidra.
The main finding is that out of the nearly 3.6 billion IPs scanned, only 1.3 billion (roughly 36%) are in use, the rest being reported as not used. This however raises the question on whether an non-responsive IP is due to a host with very strong filtering abilities. I suspect that the number of active IPs is higher than what they reported.
The article is to be found here.If you want, the scan dataset is available on the download page.
News about linux, computer, computer science, mathematics and white hot chocolate, the most beautiful drink in this world.
Friday, March 22, 2013
Wednesday, March 20, 2013
Boeing puts 787 battery through tough tests it once avoided
Okay, so nothing security related here. Except that in many an occasion, I have seen companies and people producing security documents and not respecting them.
In the Boeing case, the firm wrote a series of tests to match recommendations made by the RTCA, but it seems that for a number of reasons they decided against running the Boeing 787 batteries against these, ending in the situation we know: two batteries overheated in a plane and most of the 787 aircraft were stranded until the problem has been sorted, costing millions of US dollars around the world.
Back to security: several regulations require policies to exist and be enforced. However, it is common to see a company with security policies and find dozens of violations after a day of investigation. It results a false sentiment of security, with people claiming that they are secure due to the policies, but not realizing that systemic violations of said policies are actually equivalent to not having any policy at all. That lack of respect and enforcement has, more than a few times, led to serious data breaches.
In the Boeing case, the firm wrote a series of tests to match recommendations made by the RTCA, but it seems that for a number of reasons they decided against running the Boeing 787 batteries against these, ending in the situation we know: two batteries overheated in a plane and most of the 787 aircraft were stranded until the problem has been sorted, costing millions of US dollars around the world.
Back to security: several regulations require policies to exist and be enforced. However, it is common to see a company with security policies and find dozens of violations after a day of investigation. It results a false sentiment of security, with people claiming that they are secure due to the policies, but not realizing that systemic violations of said policies are actually equivalent to not having any policy at all. That lack of respect and enforcement has, more than a few times, led to serious data breaches.
Monday, March 18, 2013
Krebs has been SWATted
SWATting is the act of passing a call to 911 (in the US) spoofing someone and usually making claims such as a murder is in progress, or heavily armed people were seen entering the house. This prompts a response from the authorities, that send officers to verify, and from time to time, SWAT teams.
Brian Krebs, the well-known security specialist, was the target of one, from what he says, probably in response to his work in investigating some russian gangs. His web site was also the target of a DoS.
The full article on his blog here.
Brian Krebs, the well-known security specialist, was the target of one, from what he says, probably in response to his work in investigating some russian gangs. His web site was also the target of a DoS.
The full article on his blog here.
Friday, March 15, 2013
R.A. Salvatore's "The Thousand Orcs" (The Hunter's Blades Trilogy)
R.A. Salvatore writes in a really fluid style, and the story will appeal to all the AD&D fans of the Forgotten Realms.
Thursday, March 14, 2013
Wednesday, March 6, 2013
Back to basics: Urms (part II)
So, let's revisit our half rectified sine wave example.
This is given by
DC component of the half rectified sine wave
This is given by
URMS of the half rectified sine wave
As seen in part I, this is
RMS value of the alternating component
Now, the next question is: how "strong" is the total alternating component in the half rectified sine wave?
In part I we established that URMS is splitted into two parts: a continuous component and the sum of sines. The latter, the sum, is the total alternating component of the signal. The formula is
where C=UDC. Substituting, we arrive at the RMS value for the alternating part
Tying this with Fourier
This gives the RMS value for the total alternating component, but what if we are interested in the RMS value of a specific harmonic?
The Fourier Transform will be our tool: it transforms a time-domain signal to a frequency-domain one, and the Fourier Series gives us the amplitude of each harmonic.
For a half rectified sine wave of period T, the amplitudes are given by:
Here is a table of the first 5 harmonics amplitudes relative to the peak amplitude of the original signal.
For a half rectified sine wave of period T, the amplitudes are given by:
Here is a table of the first 5 harmonics amplitudes relative to the peak amplitude of the original signal.
| Harmonic | Amplitude |
|---|---|
| 1 | 0.5 |
| 2 | 0.21221 |
| 4 | 0.042441 |
| 6 | 0.018189 |
| 8 | 0.010105 |
The following graph shows the harmonic amplitudes.
Remembering that the RMS value for a sine signal is the peak intensity divided by the square root of two, we have
| Harmonic | RMS Amplitude | Cumulative RMS |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.35355 | 0.35355 |
| 2 | 0.15005 | 0.38408 |
| 4 | 0.030011 | 0.38525 |
| 6 | 0.012862 | 0.38546 |
| 8 | 0.0071454 | 0.38553 |
After just a few harmonics, we are almost at the calculated total value already.
Monday, March 4, 2013
Beefing up Public Key Encryption
Two MIT CSAIL PostDocs, Lin and Tessaro, have taken on to beef up the security of public key encryption, used for example to secure HTTPS communications, as reported in this article or by MIT's press office.
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